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News&Views 20:Jul14

 
Bay2a

LAGUNA BEACH   .   JULY 14, 2011   .   VOL XX

 News & Views
 Debt Buyers & Sellers Resource
 

Editor's Message

We are late getting this issue out again, due to a wedding in the family (ours) and a visit to meet our new grandson, Zach.  Since this newsletter is research and compiled in our free time, it is published as often as we can accomplish it.

 

After a robust Spring, Summer collections traditionally pull back a little.  Last year the downturn was significant, so as we brace ourselves for another slow summer, we look to the wider economy for clues as to what we can expect.

 

Gary charts some interesting government data which provides new perspectives  in "Revolving Credit and Bank Charge-offs".  This month he also includes his "Quarterly Report for Public Debt Buyers", as well as  in "Credit Card charge-off Rates Drop Again".  In addition, Jill begins the first of a 2 part series on "How's The Government Progressing?"  It takes a look at our struggle to move beyond the economic crisis and what the trouble spots are.

 

Revolving Credit and Bank Charge-offs

By Gary Baker

 

There is one thing that the Federal Government does is pretty well, and this is to gather data and publish great amounts of information online.  The information is available for free, but most of comes in a form that is difficult to utilize and even more difficult to understand unless it is graphed. The chart below was made based on a number of data series obtained from the Federal Reserve. From that information we have overlaid three sets of data points and have utilized two different scales to show the run-up of consumer credit between 1985 to the peak in the 3rd quarter of 2008 where outstanding credit card debt hit nearly $1.0 trillion. That number has declined dramatically in the past 9 quarters, almost $200 billion with most of that decline being as result of charge-offs.

 

It is interesting to note the relationship between unemployment and the charge-off rate. While widely reported that these two rates move hand in hand with each other, the chart below shows about a 13 year period (1985 to 1998) where they did not align like they did between 1998 and the end of 2010. The charge-off rates are dropping below unemployment again as bank lending has all but dried up along with it the issuance of many new credit cards. In the past, the banks have made a great deal of money issuing and servicing credit card accounts and it is only a matter of time, we believe, before revolving consumer credit will be on the increase again. In fact just as this article was going to press, new numbers from the Federal Reserve show that the banks increased credit card debt by $5.0 billion in May, the largest increase in the past three years.

 

20 Revolving

 

During 2005, the banks were writing off about $10 billion per quarter in credit card debt. That number fell to about $8.0 billion per quarter in 2006 and climbed to $9.5 billion per quarter in 2007. By 2008 the banks were averaging 13.3 billion per quarter and by the first quarter of 2009 that increased to$17.2 billion and continued to climb every quarter through 2009 until it peaked at $22.2 billion. By the end of 2010 the write-off had decreased to $15.6 billion in the final quarter and it fell to $13.3 billion in the first quarter of 2011. At the current trajectory the write-off should reach the 2005-2007 average later in 2011.

 

The average pricing of debt purchases as plotted is derived from several sources.  The period between 2005 and 2009 has been compiled from actual purchases of hundreds of portfolios from major debt buyers and reflects the average price paid for credit card debt. The period between 2009 and 2011 has been tracked by Crescent Bay Financial since that time, and was compiled from the average prices paid by the public companies as reported. What we see in the chart was a general run-up in debt pricing between 2005 and 2007 which cumulated in a price of over $.08 for charged-off debt. That pricing was unsustainable as many companies who were buying charged-off accounts at those prices could not get the recovery rates needed to attain profitability. The average debt price generally fell for the next few years as many of the weaker companies were lost and the economy soured, and many debt buyers positioned themselves to buy older and less expensive paper. The 2009 and beyond numbers are only influenced in this graph by the purchases of the public companies, since other data is difficult to come by, and there are only four that we report on.The public debt buyers are acquiring large volumes of paper, almost all directly from the issuer which would generally be assumed to be fresher paper than many of the other debt buyers are able to acquire. The red line on the chart represents the volume of debt being acquired by the public companies, and, in the most recent quarter the public debt buyers have acquired more that on third of all the inventory charged-off by the banks. As the amount of debt being charged-off declines and the appetite for the paper by the public buyers remains high, we can only assume that there will be additional upward price pressure.

 

Many banks held onto their debt portfolios and worked them for a cycle or two before sale which has also had a downward influence on the debt pricing in the past couple of years. But now as the supply of paper decreases, and the appetite of the large buyers for all types and ages of debt increases relative to the supply, higher prices have been forecast. We hear of deals being made where fresh charge-offs are over 11 cents, and, frankly, those prices appear to be difficult numbers to ever make a profit on. In the past, many firms shut down when liquidation rates did not match up to expectations, and we know of very few investors who will sit around for over four years to break even on a debt purchase.
 

   20 Revolving2

Quarterly Report for the Public Debt Buyers 
By Gary Baker

For the past nine quarters, we have been monitoring the performance of the publically owned debt buyers in the United States. During that period, have witnessed remarkable growth in the stock prices of several of the companies, but clearly none as spectacular as Portfolio Recovery Associates (PRAA), which has increased from $26.84 on March 9, 2009 to $83.85 on June 28, 2011. This is more than a 300% growth in share price over the period. Encore Capital (ECPG) has also enjoyed strong performance during the same period, increasing from $4.53 in March 2009 to $29.96 on June 28, 2011, an improvement of over 660% for the period. As a comparison, the S & P 500 has risen slightly less than 200% and the Dow has increased about the same as the S & P for the same time frame.

 

Asset Acceptance Corp (AACC) has actually declined in value based on the market close price on June 28, 2011 and ASTA Funding's stock price has increased about 336% for the same period. First City Financial (FCFC), who we began to track in 2009 has dropped off our recent month's coverage because their business model is different from the other public debt buyers that we cover.

 

20 Stock Price  

 Market capitalization is simply the number of shares that are owned times the share price and provides a snapshot of the current estimated value of the company. 

 

20 Mkt Cap

 

Portfolio purchases declined in the past quarter for both Encore Capital and Portfolio Recovery based on the face value of the accounts purchased, while Asset Acceptance Corp. increased their purchases from the previous quarter, which was more in line with the purchases made in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2010.

 

20 Port Purch

While Encore purchased more in face value in the first quarter of 2011 than Portfolio Recovery, PRAA actually spent almost $20 million more in acquiring new debt. These figures point to more recent charge-off dates purchased by Portfolio Recovery.

 

20 Port Pur Quartly

 

The average debt prices paid by PRAA increased significantly in the first quarter of 2011, with the average price being over $0.07, compared to about $0.045 in the 4th quarter of 2010. Asset Acceptance paid less for debt during the period, while Encore paid about the same. ASTA Funding has been purchasing more medical debt at far higher prices which has taken them off the chart.

 

20 Av Price

 

Gross collections improved for 3 of the 4 public debt buyers in the first quarter of 2011 with only Asset Acceptance reflecting lower numbers.

 

20 Gross Coll

 

The profit and loss results reflect another strong quarter for Portfolio Recovery Associates. The number for the past quarter for PRAA shown in yellow has been revised from our last issue to correct an error in our data. Encore Capital experienced a small drop in profit from the previous quarter, but still appears to be reasonably strong over the past seven quarters. NCO timed its losses by about $40 million in the past quarter, but has yet to post a profit since we began to track the results in the 3rd quarter of 2009.

 

20 P & L

 

Occasionally we see the results of other large debt buyers, typically when they are having a good quarter. Since they are not reporting regularly, we are having a difficult time incorporating the information that becomes available into the charts above. We strive to obtain the most current data and carefully plot the results, but there are times that we have errors since everything is input manually to create these charts. We apologize to PRAA for last quarter's mistake on the chart above.

Whatever Became of?
Enjoy this short summary from the Dail Bail, entitled "What Became Of The 56 Men Who Signed The Declaration Of Independence".  It is the story of brave men who put their lives on the line and changed history.  Most paid the ultimate price.
Credit Card Charge-off Rates Drop Again 
By Gary Baker

 

Credit card charge-offs have been steadily declining since March of 2010. While some cards like Bank of America and Citibank still remain at about 8%, Discover and Capital One have declined to about 5% and American Express is down to 3.2%. The credit card industry average charge-off rate is 6.95% as of the end of May 2011. The average charge-off rate since 1985 is 4.72%, and if we look at just the previous 10 years, (May 2001 through May 2011) the average charge-off is 6.00%, based the Federal Reserve Statistical Release. What this means to us, is that the charge-off rate will hit a point where is does stabilize and stop the downward fall. Now whether this is the 6% average of the previous 10 years, or as low as the 25 year average of almost 5% it is difficult to project, but it is likely that whatever number it finds, the rate of decline should soon slow and flatten out.

 

20 Chg-off Rates

 

USA, Inc.
Mary Meeker provides an in depth analysis of the Federal Budget and offers a "Turnaround Plan" with investment in the Technology Sector as  the cornerstone of recovery.  This is a very impressive document.
How's The Government Progressing? - Part One  
By Jill Benshoof 

 

Summer has arrived and the economy has slowed from lukewarm to tepid as unemployment figures tick up again for the second consecutive month after a small pullback earlier this year. The cautious optimism of April and May has deflated with the realization that there is no "there" there, with regard to our recovery, the pitiful jobs data from May and June being only the first clue.  Criticism regarding the management of the crisis has manifested itself in a steady parade of speculation about the demise of the dollar, the Bond Market bubble, the question of QE3, the threat of inflation, and a double dip in housing is that may take the entire economy down with it. 

 

False Hopes

Against that backdrop, Fortune Magazine last week published an optimistic article entitled "Surprise! The big bad Bailout is paying off".   The article asserts that the much disparaged Federal "Bailout" is actually about to pay off to the tune of a $42 billion profit to the American taxpayers by the end of 2012. Perhaps in their eagerness to paint a rosy picture, the authors overlooked the fact that the Congressional Budget Office's cost of $317 billion for Fannie and Freddie bailout is very different from the $130 billion "official White House figure" that was used in their analysis.  Or, perhaps the CBO information came out after the article was written, but, in either case, the CBO data blows their profit theory out of the water.  The fact that the profit figure is also based on projections aside, the article leaves the reader with more questions than answers; such as how taxpayer exposure ever got to be that large in the first place?  With heavy focus on TARP, which was actually only about 3% of the $14 trillion bailout exposure, most people were not aware that the risk was anywhere near that amount. It also included Fannie and Freddie, asset purchases, the nationalization of corporations and a variety of global obligations through our participation in the International Monetary Fund. While the authors acknowledge that the dynamics of the Bailout did little to help the public at large, they argue that it was necessary to prevent a complete economic meltdown.  Yet, the notion that you need to reward the perpetrators of the debacle for mismanagement and corruption in order to protect the American public seems preposterous, especially in light of the severe hardship that resulted for so many and with up to 40% of American homeowners at risk of foreclosure.

 

Witness to Corruption

In the course of back room deal making, only the deal makers have come out ahead while the Taxpayers have routinely gotten the shaft.  As Americans struggle to pay their bills and mounting debts, there is an uneasy feeling that many of those who are benefitting the most are not playing by the rules. Goldman Sachs, for example, is the poster child for Institutional corruption on Wall Street.  Corruption articles on Goldman Sschs on the internet would make your head spin. As part of the "gang" who created the bubble and then bet against the housing market it made immense profits. From stock market improprieties, to the sale of US debt funded by the bailout, to the collapse of Greece's economy, Goldman Sachs is implicated in wrong doing.  With close ties to the US Treasury, it influenced the fall of its competitors, and, as one of the "chosen" then secured its position in line to receive a big share of the spoils, not to mention bailout funds.

 

While much of the corporate corruption was blatant, there was also considerable corruption at other crossroads of money and power.  The old adage "Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely" can be applied universally as people in a leadership position exercise their influence in getting things done, and in doing so delude themselves that most of what they do is for the greater good.  Public trust in Congress is at an all time low and stories abound on ethics violations of various members.  Of particular interest is how many members of Congress have increased their wealth significantly during the recession. One study claims that "Senators on average beat the [stock] market by 12% a year."  Much of this may result from the fact that insider trading is perfectly legal for our Representatives due to a loophole in the law which Congress refuses to correct. Having the scoop on legislation that might affect a company or sector economically, and then being able to act on that through the purchase or sale of stocks is apparently one of the perks.  The reality is that those that have benefitted directly from the collapse of the economy clearly have a different perception of the seriousness of the Recession, and one can only assume that they may very well feel a different level of urgency in ultimately solving the problem.

 

What Next?

If the sheer magnitude of this Recession hasn't fully registered to some, talk of a double-dip Recession has increased recently, with estimates that it could conceivably drag out recovery for another 10 years - a terrifying thought to those who have already been hit hard and have spent the past 4 years hunkering down in survival mode.  Yet, the forecasts are erratic enough to have people confused. The truth is that economists don't agree on where the indicators are leading us.  Will the recovery ebb and flow in an anemic way inching up over time, or will it move sideways?  Or, could we be facing something worse?  Mark Zandi at Moody's Analytics believes that things are beginning to stabilize, while Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics at NYU's Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Global Economics, says that by not unilaterally addressing the core issues, Europe and the US are facing the perfect storm in 2013.

 

Housing is the Key to Recovery

Most economists seem to agree that until the housing market stabilizes, recovery is unlikely. Wall Street insider and "master trader" Shah Gilani calls the housing market "our single-most important generator of gross domestic product (GDP) and, ultimately, national wealth." Recent data indicates that banks are sitting on nearly 2 million homes.  Yet the government has set up, and is fostering, a condition wherein stabilization cannot happen.  In their effort after the collapse to take pressure off the banks which were deemed at the time to be vulnerable to collapse, the government ultimately gave the banks their cake and let them eat it too in the hope that things would stabilize.  In doing so, they established a system that makes the banks whole for every foreclosure or shortsale. In many cases the banks actually even come out ahead on the deal.  Shielding banks from all risk, has effectively removed any incentive for them to work with homeowners on saving their homes and lies at the heart of a problem that may have catastrophic consequences if nothing is done to correct it.    

 

If the rationale was to protect the financial institutions from collapse, then now that the danger is past, it's time to change a policy that is undermining the recovery process.  If the rationale was to speed up the foreclosure process to clear away bad debt and thereby hasten recovery, it has had the opposite effect.  It has set up a potential cycle where in property values have logically eroded after the first wave of subprime foreclosures, but they will inevitably continue to be undermined as long as banks are subsidized for doing so, leading to even more people becoming upside down on their mortgages and a new wave of foreclosures for as long as the reward dynamic continues.  Uncertainty in the housing market has prevailed, and as property values drop, unless someone has a lot of equity in their home, there is a point at which paying a mortgage that is considerably higher than its value, is just irrational.  Many solvent homeowners are coming to that realization and are walking away from their mortgages rather than continue to overpay when there is no likelihood that the property values will ever return to the point of breaking even, much less giving them a profit.  If cash flow is an issue, the property becomes an albatross. How low could home values drop?  Hypothetically, they could continue to fall until equilibrium is reached between rental value plus the income tax burden and the mortgage price minus the mortgage tax deduction.  

 

Loan Mod, Not An Option

In short, the government over-corrected and there is simply too much money to be made from short sales and foreclosures for the banks ever to take Loan Mods seriously. That being the case, there is nothing to arrest the steady devaluation of property values. In addition to guaranteed loss protection, the banks get paid $1000 for every delinquent customer that they refer to HUD, so foreclosure is often preceded by a government work out process for a Loan Mod.  Since the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) has a cap of $700,000, homeowners with higher mortgages do not qualify. In California where property values are so high, banks are routinely making homeowners that they know don't qualify, go through HAMP process anyway, just to collect the easy money before they start any Loan Mod or foreclosure process in earnest. Understaffed and overwhelmed by applications, the process is cumbersome and lengthy and with the new government regulations, it has slowed even more. In addition, the bank may just be servicing the loan and, in that case, paperwork ultimately must be forwarded to the lien holder.    From what we understand, since the too-big-to-fail banks are under no obligation to consider it, the Loan Mod process is primarily a courtesy to customers that keeps up appearances and maintains bank credibility, but amounts to little much more than a hoax.  Before one is summarily denied, they may be granted a "trial" loan mod.  One Loan Mod specialist that we interviewed said that even for those that complete a trial successfully, the permanent Loan Mod is usually denied in the end without explanation.  Some of the reasons for bank reluctance may stem from their long time prejudice against people who have defaulted or have bad credit, and, in fact the Loan Mod failure rate is over 65-75%. The HAMP failure rate is 88%. So, with rare exceptions it appears that the entire system again favors the banks and not the American public.

 

Sorting Out Our Problems

The sad thing is that spiraling property values hurts everyone.  However well intentioned, it's hard to make the case that government meddling is doing much good, for there are always unintended consequences that result.  And, unfortunately, memories are shockingly short when it comes to learning lessons from the past.  Take the subprime mortgage fiasco. Front Page Magazine reports that the Department of Justice is again intimidating banks into lending to unqualified minorities and they are acquiescing for fear of being labeled racist.  The article claims that welfare recipients are being considered with banks being pressured to apply irresponsible lending criteria which include welfare payments and unemployment benefits as "valid" sources of income.

 

In his article "How to Fix the U.S. Housing Market", Gilani says that one way to get the housing market back on track is for the government to offer viable tax incentives to homeowners. While not a panacea, his message is really deeper.  He states that "Unless the government is providing direct-and-transparent tax incentives to bolster homeownership," "it has no business being in the mortgage business - especially when that "business" ultimately puts taxpayers at risk." Susanne Trimbath, CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services, shares that perspective in her interesting article "Solving the Financial Crisis: Looking Beyond Simple Solutions".  She makes the point that Americans have a basic fear and distrust of all things financial. And, politicians respond to the public reaction to economic events by passing legislation du jour, which creates "regulatory chokeholds that make failures of financial institutions almost inevitable". What is needed, she says, is to enforce existing laws rather than continually create new ones.  She claims that financial crisis didn't result from too few laws, "it resulted from not enforcing the laws we already have."  She uses the Bernie Madoff example to stress the absurdity of all the hearings that resulted from that scandal as if we don't have any laws on the books to prevent Ponzi schemes. 

 

Conclusion

To ordinary people, economic theories and balance sheet perspectives don't provide much comfort midst rising food and gas prices.  The economic uncertainty is like Chinese water torture as we wait for the next shoe to drop. The only thing that is clear right now about the future is that it will be very different for our children.  Paradigms are changing, and one new one to consider is that, as an investment, the house is overrated and in the future may not be the cornerstone of success and independence that it once was.  "A Home Is a Lousy Investment", by Robert Bridges, the USC professor of clinical finance and business economics provides a surprising analysis that concludes that we have over-emphasized the importance of home in our personal finances as well as in our economy. 

 

As the congress fights over coming to grips with the debt ceiling, it is clear that the only real plan at hand is the fallback of kicking the can down the road.  How's that for denial?  At a time when we should be coming together to solve our problems, polarization seems to be escalating, with name calling and demonization of the other side the norm.  It doesn't seem like it should be that hard for a group of bright and responsible people, elected and paid handsomely to do a job, to meet in a room and develop a plan for the common good.  Common sense would indicate that to tackle any problem where expenses exceed income, any reasonable person would reduce expenses and increase income.   The problem is that simple.  While a great place to start would seemingly be by taxing the very long list of those who received windfalls and bonuses during the crisis at taxpayer expense, anyone knows that when personal or business finances become top heavy, the first thing you look at is how to cut overhead.  American overhead is beyond unreasonable, it is downright absurd.  In all practicality, that is the first place to start. This process should not, in all fairness, be pain free for anyone. 

 

"How's The Government Progressing"  is the first of a two part series. In our next edition, Part 2 will focus on the Cost of Regulation, Entitlements and Solutions by Experts.

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The Loan Buyers Group was formed to allow smaller Debt Buyers and Collection Agencies to work together to purchase National files of charged-off debt.  The group also partners with larger Debt Buyers for larger portfolio acquisitions.  For information on how what we do and how to join, visit our new Website at www.loanbuyersgroup.com.   Join us on Linked-In .com/Search Groups/"Loan Buyers Group: National Debt Buyers".
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