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News & Views 10: Mar 10

 
Bay2a
  LAGUNA BEACH                                March 29, 2010                                         VOLUME X

 News & Views
 Debt Buyers & Sellers Resource
 

In This Issue 
 
In this issue you will find our monthly "Credit Card Charge-offs" chart for the major issuers. Gary has included a piece covering the "Public Debt Buyers - Quarterly Report".  We also discuss the differences in Credit Card "paper" in "Not All Credit Card Paper is the Same", as well as the differences between the different Debt Buyers groups that have emerged on the scene in " 'Original' Loan Buyers Group: 'often copied, never equaled' ".  Green Pea Corner addresses the importance of properly "Calculating Returns".  There are a few news items that we thought were worth summarizing in Brief New Stories. And, Jill has wrapped up the issue with Part 2 of "Protective or Onerous: CFPA"which tracks the progress of the Consumer Financial Protection Act through Congress and discusses how it is projected to affect the Debt Buying Industry.   

Credit Card Charge-offs 
 by Gary Baker 

Charge-off Rates Climb for Bank of America and Citibank
The latest charge-off figures are out, and we see Bank of America and Citigroup once again reporting an increase in credit card charge-offs along with American Express and Discover. Only Capital One and JP Morgan Chase reported lower write-offs of the major issuers. The unemployment rate stayed the same as the previous month. The charge-off rates for the entire credit card industry rose slightly over last month and are now slightly lower than their recent peak last August. All of the credit card charge-off numbers are reported as an annual percentage. If Bank of America for example is reporting 13.51%, that figure means that 13.51% of all Bank of America's credit card accounts have been written off as bad debt, and the company takes a loss for all of those accounts. These are huge numbers when we consider the number of accounts and average balances that are distributed between the issuing banks. In 2009 banks wrote off a record $83.27 billion in credit card debt. A study by a consumer credit research site CardHub, found that accounts for the bulk of the $93.2 billion drop in consumer credit card balances reported by the Fed for last year.

 

Credit

Bank

American 

Capital 

Discover

JP

Citigroup

Credit

Jobless

Card

of

Express

One

 

Morgan

 

Card

Rate

Issuer

America

 

 

 

Chase

 

Industry

 

Feb. 1999

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.4%

Feb. 2007

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.51%

4.5%

Feb. 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.59%

4.8%

Aug. 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.82%

6.2%

Feb-09

 

8.70%

8.06%

 

6.35%

9.33%

8.82%

8.1%

Mar-09

9.31%

8.80%

9.33%

7.39%

7.13%

9.66%

9.30%

8.5%

Apr-09

10.47%

10.10%

8.56%

8.26%

8.07%

10.21%

9.97%

8.9%

May-09

12.50%

10.40%

9.41%

8.91%

8.36%

10.50%

10.62%

9.4%

Jun-09

13.86%

9.90%

9.73%

8.75%

8.04%

10.50%

10.76%

9.5%

Jul-09

13.81%

8.92%

9.83%

8.43%

7.92%

10.03%

10.52%

9.4%

Aug-09

14.54%

8.50%

9.32%

9.16%

8.73%

12.14%

11.49%

9.7%

Sep-09

14.25%

8.40%

9.77%

8.69%

8.12%

10.15%

10.72%

9.8%

Oct-09

13.22%

7.80%

9.04%

8.54%

8.02%

8.79%

9.04%

10.2%

Nov-09

13.00%

7.60%

9.60%

8.98%

8.81%

10.29%

10.56%

10.0%

Dec-09

13.53%

7.10%

10.14%

8.68%

7.11%

9.56%

10.32%

10.0%

Jan-10

13.25%

7.00%

10.41%

8.58%

10.91%

9.80%

11.07%

9.7%

Feb-10

13.51%

7.40%

10.19%

9.11%

9.21%

11.29%

11.08%

9.7%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Moody's Investment Services, Reuters, Bureau of Labor Statistics

 
The Public Debt Buyers - Quarterly Report 
 

The quarterly reports are out for most of the public debt buying companies. Of the four companies that have reported, three were profitable and one showed a loss in the 4th quarter. The stock prices for three of the companies improved slightly from the 3rd quarter and one company (Portfolio Recovery) has seen a 26% increase in their stock price in the last quarter.

 

On average, these companies paid $0.0362 for new portfolios in the 4th quarter compared to $0.0345 in the 3rd quarter. Liquidation rates have not been reported.

 

In trying to determine the 4th quarter profitability, we would take the total profit reported in the quarter divided by the gross collections for each company. This would equal roughly 13% for PRAA, 6.75% for ECPG, 8.5% for ASFI and a loss of 27% for AACC. If all the four public companies that we have data on were averaged together, there was a loss. If we eliminated the company that lost money in the quarter from the calculation, the quarterly profit would be 9.35%.

 
4th Quarter 2009
    Stock  Stock Market       
Company Symbol Price Price Capitalization Employees Profit Loss
    12/2/2009 3/10/2010        
NCO NCO Private     34000    
Portfolio Recovery Assoc. PRAA 45.27 57.21 887.91 2032 $12.4 Mil  
Encore Capital ECPG 17.36 17.70 413.46 1500 $8.4 Mil  
West Asset Management   Private          
Asset Acceptance Corp AACC 5.71 5.82 178.04 1700   $20.2 Mil
ASTA Funding, Inc. ASFI 6.84 7.40 105.62 105 $2.5 Mil  
FirstCity Financial Corp. FCFC 7.44 5.55   265 No Current Data
   
    Impairment Portfolios Face Average Price  
Company Symbol Charge Bought Value Paid For Portfolios Notes
            Gross Collections
NCO NCO No Current Data        
Portfolio Recovery Assoc. PRAA $9.5 Mil $75.1 Mil $2.0 Bil $0.0376 $95.3 Mil A
Encore Capital ECPG $5.0 Mil $41.2Mil $1.0 Bil $0.0412 $124.5 Mil  
West Asset Management   No Current Data       B
Asset Acceptance Corp AACC $32.4 Mil $43.0 Mil $1.4 Bil $0.0307 $74.8 Mil  
ASTA Funding, Inc. ASFI 0 $2.3 Mil No Current Data $29.4 Mil  
FirstCity Financial Corp. FCFC No Current Data - Reports March 30, 2010
               
Notes:
A   For 12 month period acquired $8.1 Billion of face-value for $289 Million.
(Like newer files, HSBC Fresh and 1 agency 5 year flow no resale at good price
B   Winding down debt purchasing business. No purchases in 3rd quarter, No purchases since 1st quarter
when spent $1.7Mil. Total revenues down $40.7 mil compared to Q3 2008. Filed to go public again.
 
 

These are well run public companies, which spent between them, over $161 million buying debt (over $4.4 billion face value) in the last quarter. They have efficient systems, good management, and a long history in the business. They also maintain substantial amounts of data and know how each portfolio they buy should recover. In addition, they pay far less for collections, than most debt buyers. (Some use oversees collectors to further reduce their costs). If the biggest companies in the business are averaging less than 38% annual returns (it is far less if you include the company that lost money), the small debt buyers who are in this business need to be doing business much smarter in addition to buying their inventory for less.

Not All Credit Card Paper is the Same
 by Gary Baker
 

When we think of fresh credit card charge-offs from a major issuer, the tendency is to expect that we should see similar liquidation rates between the different banks. Perhaps historically that has been the case, but in this new economy different characteristics are emerging. When the major banks issued credit to their customers, they each had different criteria for determining the credit worthiness of the applicant. Some banks issued accounts to basically anyone with a pulse it appears, while others only gave credit to those individuals with the highest credit scores and big incomes.

 

Perhaps Bank of America and Citibank were to lenient in their underwriting standards and by reviewing their charge-off rates as compared to other issuers, they are paying a large price for their previous standards. But some banks who are not on the list like US Bank, are also suffering and for different reasons. Both US Bank and American Express had much higher standards when they originally issued credit. Generally their customers were in a much higher income bracket and maintained very high credit scores. When these accounts go to charge-off it is not because their customers are unwilling to pay, it is because they can not pay and this is generally because they have lost their high paying job. Many of these customers are having a very difficult time finding employment at the same salary levels that they enjoyed before. While some are finding new work at much lower wages, many others are struggling to adapt to the new economy and may have to get new training or education prior to re-entering the workforce.

 

Unemployment rates have hovered around the 10% level for some time now as have the credit card charge-off rates. Until we can create new jobs, which will require the banks to lend again, which are reluctant because of massive charge-offs of credit card debt and other loan losses; we are stuck in a very difficult situation. When banks lose their highest rated customers to this economy, it is easy to see their reluctance to lend more, especially to some of their other customers with less than perfect credit.


 Collection Statistics
 According to the American Collectors Association: 
  • 50% of customers with bad debt have the ability to pay the debt, they simply choose not to.
  • 80% of all accounts collected by collection agencies are collected by written demands.
  • The older a debt becomes the less collectable it is.  At 150 days past due the likelihood of recovery of a debt decreases by over 49%.
  • Debtors prioritize which bills to pay according to the perceived consequences.  In most cases the perceived consequence of not paying the phone or cable bill is greater than the consequence of not paying an overdrawn checking account or loan.
"Original" Loan Buyers Group - "often copied, never equaled" Editorial: by the founder of the Loan Buyers Group
 

Crescent Bay Financial started the Loan Buyers Group last September. It was pretty obvious to us that if would be difficult for small buyers to make money if they were forever stuck in the retail market. By joining forces, we could theoretically compete with the "big boys". Since then two new groups have emerged that offer a group approach to buying. One group has structured theirs in a different way, and one of the groups has copied our program almost exactly with a few significant differences. (It appears to us that they went to our website and virtually lifted all of our information.)  What made this noteworthy was that this past week they came out with a statement boasting of "pioneering" the concept themselves. While this is, of course, nonsense, we felt compelled to put out a "Buyer Beware" advisory and to encourage anyone considering this opportunity to do their due diligence.  Here we provide a brief comparison.

 

Since the other groups both charge hefty fees to participate in their group buying efforts, it doesn't take a brain surgeon to deduce pretty quickly that this could significantly impact one's profits. One group charges $1400 per month for the privilege of participating, and the other charges $3500 per year with restrictions on who the members can buy from.

 

Let's do the math. If someone were participating in the $1400 per month program and had $25,000 to invest in portfolios, they may only earn about $11,650 in profits (in the best case scenario, taking the best of today's averages) during the year for a fresh charge-off (based on the detailed review reported later in this newsletter). If that buyer actually paid $1400 per month for the "privilege" of being part of the buying group, they would in all likelihood, have lost money on the year. If the amount to invest were $50,000, the return for the debt buyer would be about $6500 for the year (13%) and the "manager" would have made $16,800 for no investment risk.

 

The other group operates differently. You are required to sign on to a restrictive contract and pay a $3500 fee for the year. You are not permitted during that year to buy from any other source except for the broker who sets the price on the inventory that you can buy. All proceeds from collections have to be reinvested into new purchases during the term of the contract at the prices that their broker sets. Also, from what we can determine, neither of the 2 other groups model their portfolios for performance, before purchase. Both groups also focus only on fresh charge-offs, which we find through our extensive modeling, do not perform as well as other products. The events that led to a credit card being freshly charged-off are still fresh for the customer.

 

Clearly, all Groups are not created equally. If you are interested in participating in a group that buys at wholesale, has no monthly or annual fees, models every portfolio from a variety on vendors and only selects the best performing files to present to the Group Members using current recovery rates, and provides monthly reports that track actual portfolio performance, contact the "Original" Loan Buyers Group. Information is shared freely to the members and many have said that they have learned more from us than from any of the expensive educational programs they have attended. You can find out what we do on our web site.  "We are often copied but never equaled."

 

In addition to the services we pioneered for the individual debt buyers, the Loan Buyers Group also provides Group Buying for Collection Agencies, Collection Attorneys and large debt buyers. We do not post the specifics of our methods and strategies for the larger buyers on our website. For more information on collection agency and large buyer purchases, please contact Gary by email or phone.  (949) 499-8010

Green Pea Corner
By Gary Baker
 
Calculating Returns 
 
Many new buyers have been taught to expect 3:1 returns on their investment in this business.  The reality may leave most disappointed.  In addition, many of those people are unclear as to exactly what 3:1 returns actually mean.  If you want to increase your chances of making money in this business, it is important to understand how returns are calculated.
 
There are several methods commonly used by debt buyers to describe returns. One method is the use of a ratio to describe collection returns such as a 3:1 return. Returns being expressed in this manner can be very misleading because in many instances this is interpreted by inexperienced buyers as a 300% profit, which it is not.
 
A simple way to understand this ratio is as follows. If we had 1 dollar to invest and received back after a period of time 3 dollars, we would have achieved a 3:1 gross return. We now have to deduct our expenses associated in generating the 3 dollars of return to determine what our profit is. We also need to know how much time was involved in getting back the 3 dollars so we can express the return on an annual basis.
 
In this business we have several costs to consider when calculating our returns. The cost of purchasing the portfolio, broker fees, the cost of collections and the overhead or management costs, all impact our net returns.
 
An Example of 3:1 Returns
 
If we were to pay 1 dollar for a portfolio and 33% for the cost of collections, our net return can be expressed as follows.
        Gross Returns               $3.00               (gross collections)
        Cost of Portfolio           $1.00               (your investment)
        Cost of Collections       $1.00               ($3.00 collected x 33% = $1.00)
        Net Return                   $1.00               (less fees plus resale value of portfolio)
 
This would be a 100% return (we invested $1.00 and received $1.00 in profit) if there were no additional costs, although the time frame is not specified.  The example above is oversimplified and that is a weakenss.  Other fees that need to be considered in determining returns:
  •  Collection Management Fees
  • Portfolio Acquisition Fees (Broker)
  • Monthly Coaching Fees
  • Annual Membership Fees
  • Interest Costs 
     
    The example also does not include any resale value of the portfolio. The example implies however that if you were to spend 4.5¢ to buy a portfolio, that you would get back 13.50¢ in collection returns. Given a simple statement like 3:1 returns, without providing a specific time frame, and without including all of costs, the ratio is of very little value.
     
    Looking at a Different Example
     
    As we have stated, many factors influence the actual returns for the debt buyer. The price paid for the file, the cost of collections, the recovery rate, the resale value, the broker fees and monthly fees for management or coaching in addition to general overhead expenses for the buyer, plus any interest the buyer must pay for the use of funds. So while the example below here uses real calculations, the results for each individual will differ depending on their overhead and interest costs.
     
    In the next example, we are going to use a portfolio of Fresh charge-off credit card debt. We will call this Bankcard A and we will assume that we were able to buy a $10.0 million National file for 4¢. (The 4¢ figure was near the low end of Fresh charge-off pricing as of the end of 2009 as reported by Kaulkin Ginsberg in a webinar hosted 12-2-09) For this example we will also include a 5% fee for acquisition of the portfolio. Since this is a Fresh charge-off portfolio, we assume we were able to secure a capable collection agency at 33% which included our professional portfolio manager fees. (We may have membership fees and monthly coaching fees but we will ignore those costs for the time being.) Let's assume that we did not borrow any funds to purchase the portfolio and we do not expect to compensate ourselves for any of our time spent in managing the portfolio.
     
    Let's also assume that our buyer has performed some research and has a good idea how the portfolio will liquidate in 12 months. Our buyer also knows that the resale value of the portfolio will diminish in time and has estimated the expected resale pricing for the portfolio at the end of 12 months. Our buyer has discovered that the approximate liquidation range for an average Fresh charge-off portfolio varies from 4.8% to 6.5% in 12 months, and that the resale value of their portfolio will be about 35% to 45% of the purchase price at the end of 12 months. Our buyer assumes that they can obtain the highest liquidation rate, and that they will also get the highest resale value for the portfolio. (This is not a conservative approach to the calculations for the buyer. A 5.5% gross recovery rate for 12 months would be a smarter number to use, but herein we are choosing to reflect the best case scenario.)
     
    Let's Run the Numbers
     
            Face Value of the Portfolio                   $10.0 million
            Purchase Price                                     
            Broker Fees                                         5%
            Collection Cost                                     33%
            12 Month Recovery Rate                      6.5%
            12 Month Resale Value                         45%
            Brokerage Fee - Resale                        5%
     
    Purchase $10,000,000.00 x 4% = $400,000
    Broker Fees (5%) $400,000 x 5% = $20,000
                                                                          Purchase Cost = $420,000
     
    Gross Collections ($10,000,000 x 6.5%) = $650,000
    Collection Cost ($650,000 x 33%) = $214,500
                                                                         Net Collections = $435,500
     
    Resale Value ($400,000 x 45%) = $180,000
    Broker Fees Resale ($180,000 x 5%) = $9,000
                                                                         Net Resale Value = $171,000
     
    We now add take the net collections and add the resale value and subtract the purchase cost.
     
    Net Collections    $435,500
    Net Resale Value $171,000
                  Subtotal $606,500
     
    Less Purchase Cost $420,000
                                                                         Gross Profit $186,500
     
    Total 12 Month Return ($186,500 / $420,000) = 44.40% return in 12 Months, or, to compare the numbers as we did for the public companies ($186,500 / $650,000) = 28.69% returns. (Considering that most debt buyers pay more for inventory and higher collection costs than the large public companies, this number makes sense)
     
    Note: If the buyer were to pay 4.5% for the file and 25% for collections, the return in 12 months is 43.89% using all the same criteria reflected in the above calculations. However, if the buyer were to pay 5.5% for the file and 25% for collections, the returns in 12 months are 25.13%. The returns will get worse the more that is being paid for the file, and these numbers do not include any monthly management fees, interest expense or overhead costs.
     
    Since the industry average is about a 30% annual return, this scenario appears reasonable for the buyer if they can hit the highest recovery rates and in fact resell the portfolio at the high end of its value. To achieve a 3:1 return as outlined earlier, either the one or a combination of things must change in the example.
     
    1. Paying less for the portfolio will change the returns. It's a great idea if a lower price can be negotiated. The 4¢ price outlined here is at the low end of what Fresh paper has been selling for if the buyer can even gain access at this price. Most paper is sold by brokers, resellers and through bids which try to bring the highest price.
       
    2. Improving the liquidation rates will have an impact on the returns. Unfortunately the recovery or liquidation rates are very low across all asset classes. The elevated unemployment rate which has hovered around 10% for some time is not forecast to improve greatly in the very near future. The loss of home equity, the tight policies of the lenders and a generally poor economy are not expected to recover anytime soon. Just because someone pays more for a file, does not mean the file will liquidate higher.
       
    3. Paying less for collections also will improve the returns. The rates used in this example are already at the lower end of the scale. (However, an argument can be made that higher returns can be generated for the buyer by paying the collectors higher rates and providing an incentive for the collector to work harder on your behalf.)
       
    4. Important Note: We very seldom buy Fresh charge-offs for our Loan Buyers Group because of the very low performance characteristics during our typical holding time. Fresh is attractive to the large institutional buyers with a much longer time horizon than our average individual buyer. Fresh from the major banks also has higher balance accounts generally, which may work well for a large buyers legal strategy, and Fresh typically has a longer shelf life because of the length of time remaining on the statute of limitations. Big buyers have access to large amounts of capital, often at very attractive terms and their shareholders have different expectations than the typical small debt buyer. Often times the institutional buyers will buy the larger national files on a forward flow to lock in pricing, and work those accounts for years using a combination of strategies, and may never resell the files. Some sellers also have placed restrictions in their contracts regarding when a file can be resold.
     
    Adjusting the Numbers and the Timeframe

    An alternative way to look at this sample portfolio, to see if you can increase your returns, would be to hold the file and collect for a longer period of time. 24 months is used in the following example. We should also look at the impact on the net returns by paying a higher price for the portfolio initially and a lower collection cost. So let us assume the following criteria in making a new calculation.
     
            Face Value of the Portfolio                   $10.0 million
            Purchase Price                                      4.5¢
            Broker Fees                                         5%
            Collection Cost                                     25%
            24 Month Recovery Rate                      8%
            24 Month Resale Value                         30%
            Brokerage Fee - Resale                        5%
     
    Purchase $10,000,000.00 x 4.5% = $450,000
    Broker Fees (5%) $350,000 x 5% = $22,500
                                                                                   Purchase Cost = $472,500
     
    Gross Collections ($10,000,000 x 8%) = $800,000
    Collection Cost ($800,000 x 25%) = $200,000
                                                                                   Net Collections = $600,000
     
    Resale Value ($450,000 x 30%) = $135,000
    Broker Fees Resale ($135,000 x 5%) = $6,750
                                                                                   Net Resale Value = $128,250
     
    We now add take the net collections and add the resale value and subtract the purchase cost.
     
    Net Collections    $600,000
    Net Resale Value $128,250
                 Subtotal $728,250
     
    Purchase Cost $472,500
                                                                                  Gross Profit $255,750
     
    Total 12 Month Return ($255,750 / $472,500) = 54.13% return in 24 Months
     
    Note: The collection costs will increase generally the older the file. In this example we used a 25% collection rate for the entire 24 months. The rate for the second 12 month period will be higher than the first 12 months and could be in the 40% or higher range, depending on many factors.
     
    From these examples, it is difficult to demonstrate a credible 3:1 return. If a buyer were able to obtain a Fresh charge-off at 3¢ and eventually collect 9¢ on the file that would be 3:1. All of the research that we have conducted and the experiences that we have had with files in addition to the numerous portfolios that we have modeled do not provide us with any validation that we can achieve those types of liquidation rates in a 12 month period of time.  
     
    Liquidation Rates
     
    Liquidation Rates are everything to the debt buyer, and good data can be very difficult to obtain. Many brokers will share how a file has liquidated before, but generally these numbers are hard to document and more typically, they may have been one or two good months of collections, and maybe some time ago. The industry publications discuss liquidation rates in such broad ranges that it is very difficult to determine performance history on most types of files. Other times liquidation rates are discussed as percentages of how certain types of products performed in the past such as; "liquidation rates are down 55% to 65% below 2008 levels" Most debt buying firms keep this information to themselves. Collectors however, may share performance data on files that they have worked.
     
    Finally, we do have to remember that the price we pay for a file and place for collection, does not determine how the file will ultimately liquidate. Two files with identical characteristics will generally liquidate the same, even if one file costs twice as much to acquire as the other. For the collection costs, if you were a collection agency, which file would your collectors work harder; the one that pays 25% or the one that pays 40%? If the 40% collector is recovering 50% more than the 25% agency, the debt buyer would realize about 17% more in profits by using the more expensive agency.
     
    Addendum:
     
    For our last example we will use what some may call the worst case scenario. We assume that we are buying a portion of a national file at 5.8% plus broker fees, and that our contribution to the purchase is $50,000. We are convinced that we want fresh files and that we are going to pay a monthly management fee of $1400. Our example buyer has decided to use the average collection recovery number of 5.5% to calculate their expected performance, and that they will be paying their collection agency 28%. Our buyer also assumes that they will collect for a year and resell they file at the highest price which they have determined is 45% of the purchase price.
     
    Let's Run the Numbers
     
            Face Value of the Portfolio                   $862,070
            Purchase Price                                     5.8¢
            Broker Fees                                         5%
            Collection Cost                                    28%
            12 Month Recovery Rate                     5.5%
            12 Month Resale Value                        45%
            Brokerage Fee - Resale                        5%
     
    Purchase $862,068.70 x 5.8% = $50,000
    Broker Fees (5%) $50,000 x 5% = $2500
                                                                                Purchase Cost = $52,500
     
    Gross Collections (862,068.70 $x 5.5%) = $47,414
    Collection Cost ($47,414 x 28%) = $13,275.92
                                                                               Net Collections = $34,138
     
    Resale Value ($50,000 x 45%) = $22,500
    Broker Fees Resale ($22,500 x 5%) = $1,125
                                                                              Net Resale Value = $21,375
     
    We now add take the net collections and add the resale value and subtract the purchase cost.
     
    Net Collections $34,138
    Net Resale Value $21,375
                 Subtotal $55,513
     
    Purchase Cost $52,500
                                                                             Gross Profit $3,013
     
    Total Return in 12 months ($3,013 / $52,500) = 5.74% Gross Return
     
    Monthly fees of $1400 x 12 = $16,800 (Manager receives 32% return on our investment)
    Gross profit of $3,013 - $16,800 = a loss of $13,787 for the year
     
    If the initial investment amount was to double to $100,000, and all other calculations remained the same, our profit would also double to $6,026 which would only leave us with a loss of $10,774 for the year if we paid for the monthly fees. (The manager then would only receive a 16.0% return on our investment.)
     
    Buying more and more retail offerings will not improve our returns given the recent liquidation values of fresh portfolios. Portfolio pricing is far more important than collection costs in the calculation of returns for our portfolios. Excessive management fees, also negatively affect the overall performance of a portfolio, especially for the smaller buyer where there is less volume to offset these costs. Assuming that our own recovery rates will outperform the industry averages is probably not only foolish, but could potentially be a very expensive lesson.
     
    A final word about Fresh Charge-offs
     
    Some new buyers may expect that purchasing Fresh Charge-off accounts is like buying a new car. Good paint, the latest sound and navigation system, and the new car smell. They know that there will be some depreciation when they drive it off the lot, but hey, it's a new car. What new buyers must understand is these portfolios are nothing like a new car. This is charged off debt we are buying and it was charged-off because the customer did not pay on their account. Typically the customer did not pay because they could not, due to a loss of a job, health or family issues or plain bad luck or mismanagement. Seldom did the customer just wake up one morning and decide that they were just not going to pay their bills any longer.
     
    All of these accounts were worked by the banks before being charged-off and in many instances the banks offered very generous settlement plans prior to the accounts being charged-off. Bank of America was offering an 85% discount on the customer's credit card balance, with a payment plan of 4 months to 6 months to try to settle the accounts prior to charge-off. Other banks offered similar plans. When the customer could not take advantage of these options prior to charge-off, how can we expect that 30 or 60 days later we will be more successful. This is a different economy, and time will be required for customers to rebuild their lives and pay their debt. Maybe a year or two will be required for people to get back on their feet, we just don't know. But it is common for people who have fallen so far behind, to declare bankruptcy and if we happen to own those accounts, they become worthless. There is no exact prediction as to how many or when these portfolios may be subject to bankrupt customers, but they appear to occur with greater frequency within a year or so of charge-off, than any other time.
 Loan Buyers Group Update
 
The Loan Buyers Group has purchased 36,000 credit card accounts representing almost $100 million in face value during the past 4 months. The Group members have acquired these accounts from a variety of different issuers and the portfolio purchases are diversified in previous agency placements, consistent with the Groups overall strategy. Targeted returns are calculated utilizing current recovery data and performance is tracked and reported monthly to participating members. Overall performance has remained consistent with projections. More information about the Group can be obtained at www.loanbuyersgroup.com
Brief News Stories 
 
According to Market Watch:
 
In the week ended March 13, 2010 initial jobless claims have dropped to a seasonally adjusted 457,000 from 462,000 in the prior week. Although jobless claims have fallen a combined 41,000 in the past three weeks, they are still 5.8% higher compared to the end of 2009. Yet senior economic officials at the White House repeated a warning this week that unemployment might remain near its current level of 9.7% for an "extended period."
 
White House officials predict the economy will add an average of 100,000 jobs a month in 2010, but that would just keep pace with natural growth in the labor force. Jobs would have to be created at double that pace to sharply reduce unemployment.
 
Lawmakers also passed another stimulus bill, worth $17.6 billion, aimed at creating more jobs. Included in the measure are temporary tax credits for businesses that hire additional workers.
 
In the week of Feb. 27, the number of workers receiving extended federal benefits climbed 352,000 to 6.04 million, not seasonally adjusted.
 
"That is the highest level we have ever seen in these emergency/extended benefits programs and is yet another reminder of the enormous slack plaguing the US labor market," economist Neil Dutta of Bank of America/Merrill Lynch wrote in a report.
 
Altogether, 11.65 million people were collecting some type of unemployment benefits in the week of Feb. 27, up from 11.36 million. The numbers are not seasonally adjusted.
 
 
FDCPA and Other Consumer Rights Lawsuit Statistics ending February 28, 2010:
 
Statistics Year to Date:

1742 total lawsuits for 2010, including:
  • 1470 FDCPA (vs. 1120 same period 2009, 824 same period 2008)
  • 164 FCRA (vs. 186 same period 2009, 189 same period 2008)
  • 7 TCPA (vs. 3 same period 2009, 5 same period 2008)
  • 69 TILA (Truth in Lending Act)  
 
New Scoring Models:
 
Traditional Scoring models and Credit Bureau reporting effectiveness, in determining the customer's ability to pay, has changed in the past two years. The data gathered traditionally by the major Credit Bureaus having to do with a mortgage, was once viewed as one of the most credible indicators of a borrowers ability to pay. Today that mortgage may be underwater or in foreclosure which severely restricts the borrowers ability to pay. Since mortgage payments are now stopped, many borrowers have shifted their priorities to credit cards to keep their credit lines open.
 
Collections models that are built only on established performance data may not be adequate to prioritize the accounts for collections or to predict the recovery rates of the accounts. Some newer scoring models use alternative data sources such as non-traditional credit, social media and geographic based information in addition to traditional Credit Bureau reporting.
 

Protective or Onerous?CFPA  (Consumer Financial Protection Agency) - Part 2, by Jill Benshoof

 

 

In Volume 8 we covered the background and evolution of this bill from its inception in June 2009, through Congressional approval in December.  Part 2 covers what has transpired with this important piece of legislation since then and what this means to the Debt Collection Industry.

 

Background Summary

 

From Part 1 - In early December, the House passed what is being called by CNN as "the most sweeping set of changes to the banking regulatory system since the New Deal".  Aimed at preventing a variety of abuses and manipulations which ultimately led to the financial market meltdown that caused the recession, the new bill is being hailed by proponents as the first of its kind to focus on the taxpayer rights.  Yet, as the bill runs the gauntlet of Congressional debate, and special interest groups weigh in, like the Healthcare bill, it is already morphing into something that few, other than the creators, are happy with.  From a "consumer protection" standpoint, the original intent as proposed by the White House has been considerably diluted.  While still a work in progress, at this point, one thing is clear, and that is if passed, it will shake up our entire financial system as never before.  Old agencies will be transformed or consolidated, new agencies will be formed, and government bureaucracy will be increased.  The changes will be far reaching, and the Debt Collection Industry and when all is said and done, will not escape scrutiny.    

 

During the course of its evolution, The Consumer Protection bill was merged with several other related pieces of "regulatory" legislation to become H.R. 4173, the "Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009".  ".  It was introduced by Barney Frank on December 2nd and kept under wraps until December 8th, according to Susan Foster of NWV news, "to ensure the least amount of time for review and debate by the House members." House deliberations apparently lasted all of 3 hours. 

 

So, as we entered the new decade, H.R. 4173 emerged, under oversight from a very "progressive" administration, unleashing the heavy hand of government to purportedly correct and control the perceived problems and abuses that sent the US economy in a tail spin. Yet, somewhere along the line the focus has shifted from a consumer oriented bill, to a big bank oriented bill, providing more oversight, but stronger capital cushions to the largest banks and Wall Street Firms.  Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann of Minnesota called the bill even worse than the Healthcare bill, in that the government will now determine who gets capital and who doesn't in our capital driven economy.  In the theatre of the legislative process, decidedly political performances of our Representatives reflect more than ideology.  They factor in varying influences and pressures from constituents and lobbyists, and often the bill that emerges is a far cry from the original intent.

 

In this case, a very notable component of H.R. 4173 has become the long list of exemptions, all of which are significant players when it comes to potential consumer abuses.  Lawyers, CPAs, Real Estate Brokers and Agents, providers of IRAs, 401K and Pension Plans, and, the Auto Industry, despite the fact that they represent a large proportion of consumer loans, the rationale being that the auto industry had little to do the with the economic crisis.  Since mortgage and auto loans represent the lion's share of all consumer debt in sheer monetary value, it would be difficult not to conclude that there wasn't a significant amount of influence pedaling at play.    Furthermore, the bill is being severely criticized for limiting the power over smaller institutions" and deceptively exempting 98% of the nation's banks and credit unions from protection rules.  Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois in talking about the crisis that the bank's helped create,  was quoted as saying that "It's hard to believe in a time when we're facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created - they are still the most powerful lobby on Capital Hill.  And frankly, they own the place." All of these exemptions serve to water down the consumer protection thrust of the original proposal.  At this point even moderate Democrats are concerned that the CFPA will hurt small businesses. Now in the Senate, the bill was referred on January 20th to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

 

TBTF

 

Conspicuously absent from the bill as it entered the Senate was any legislation relating to the Too Big To Fail issue.  In a 12/30/09 article entitled " 'Financial Reform' Just Camouflage for Wall Street's Latest Power Play", Shah Gilani, a contributing editor of Money Morning, on-line investment newsletter, presents the perspective that all the bank mergers that have taken place are a short term "Wall Street victory" that has provided a 'back-door route to socialization".  Pointing to the stock market surge this year, he warns that this trend toward the elimination of competition is ultimately "tearing apart the fabric of credit extension and risk management that our country relies on." By failing to tackle the 'too big to fail' (TBTF) issue, he accuses legislators of "facilitating and perpetuating" the concentration of banking interests, which will lead to price collusion and concentration of risk.  Mr. Gilani also warns about the dangers of politicizing the Federal Reserve and calls the creation of the CFPA a redundant replacement of the SEC, the CFTC, the OTC, the OCC, the FINRA, the FDIC and the Fed, that is nothing more than a "regulatory arbitrage game".

 

On January 21st, President Obama finally took the first bold step in addressing the TBTF issue by calling for new limits on the size and activities of big banks.  The proposal calls for new limits on the size of banks to promote healthy competition and to minimize any damage that a failure could wreak on the economy.   It also bans any federally insured banks from investing in the capital markets, such as private equity funds and hedge funds.  Since Tim Geitner has been an outspoken opponent of large bank breakups, one couldn't help but notice that it was Paul Volker standing with Obama when the announcement was made, with Geitner later giving mixed messages on the interpretation of the program.  The proposal still must wend it way through Congress, and, while we still don't know what final form this will take, there was a fast response from JP Morgan Chase, within weeks notifying surprised patrons in February that it would no longer carry FDIC insurance at all.  It looks like Chase is pretty confident that it is already too big to fail.

  

Significance to the Collection and Debt Buying Industry

 

The regulatory reform bill is expected to have major impact on the Collection and Debt Buying Industry and both the ACA and the DBA have been actively lobbying against it.  Under the new bill the CFPA would assume the enforcement authority over the Credit and Collection Industry currently held by the FTC.  The new authority would oversee such things as 'cease and desist' actions and civil penalty litigation.  The FTC, as a "backstop authority" would therefore refer any proposed enforcement actions to the CFPA for approval, and institute its own enforcement action if the CFPA failed to do so.  Unlike the FTC, the CFPA would have rulemaking authority, as yet undefined, but relating to "Unfairness".  Recognizing that the term "unfairness" is sufficiently vague enough to have questionable consequences, congress had previously, purposely limited the rulemaking authority of the FTC.  This bill is missing any such limitations.  As the new bill also gives States the right to adopt consumer protection laws that are even stricter than the new federal laws, the industry ultimately faces potential regulation from all 3 sources spawning considerable concern for potential conflicts which may arise between the 3 authorities.  It appears that the current patchwork of varying and conflicting laws and regulations may get even more complex and costly.

 

The CFPA would also have broader regulatory powers including the powers to restrict compensation, to impose examination and registration and to collect fines and annual assessments from all regulated entities.  Thus far, registration has typically been determined on a state by state basis. Some fear that this bill creates a "built-in", carte blanche, incentive to impose licensure on many of those businesses which are not currently held to that standard, Collection Agencies and Debt Buyers among them.  Jim Miller, former Chairman of the FTC, was quoted as saying that the new bill "is like putting the FTC on steroids".

 

The oversight of the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) and the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) would both fall under CFPA jurisdiction. With the passage of some form of the bill seen as inevitable, the DBA and the ACA are actively involved in trying influence the direction of that legislation. In fact, they have recently teamed up with the CLLA (Commercial Law League of America) and NARCA (National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys) to encourage congress to maintain the FTC regulation authority.  While the Debt Collection Industry is small as compared to banking and other banking related industries, it currently contributes $40 billion to the economy and is a significant employer. 

 

Stay Tuned
 

It remains to be seen what the final form of this bill will take.  When all is said and done, the question is, will consumers really be any more protected, or will we just have saddled ourselves with more layers of bureaucracy, increasing the cost of business and providing yet more fuel for the litigators. When you look objectively at what we already have in place for the protection of consumers, in the way of existing government regulation, and the 50 agencies that are currently involved in consumer protection issues, (not to mention all of the consumer advocacy groups)  it is laughable to think that more bureaucracy is the answer.  A good argument can be made that the sheer complexity of our regulatory and judicial systems have carried us too far afield from common sense approaches to solving our problems, and have, in actuality, laid the groundwork for abuse, manipulation and corruption.  The whole point of consumer protection is to assure public safety, public health and to prevent people or businesses from engaging in fraudulent practices that undermine competition and harm others, and we have a multitude of systems in place to accomplish this.  The massive failing of these certainly bears scrutiny, but it would seem that tightening the ship is a far easier and smarter course of action than building a new one. 

 

Business Funding Sources

Self Directed Retirement Accounts (Published in Volume III)
15 years ago BeneTrends was the first company to introduce the 401(k) self-reliant business funding program. With this IRS approved plan in place, you will have the ability to use your own retirement account start a business or grow your existing business with out incurring taxes, penalties or loan payments. (We have confirmed that your debt buying business is eligible) Contact BeneTrends.

The Loan Buyers Group was formed to allow smaller Debt Buyers and Collection Agencies to work together to purchase National files of charged-off debt.  The group also partners with larger Debt Buyers for larger portfolio acquisitions.  For information on how what we do and how to join, visit our new Website at www.loanbuyersgroup.com.   Join us on Linked-In .com /Search Groups/"Loan Buyers Group: National Debt Buyers".

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